Negotiating the EU data protection reform: reflections on the household exemption by Xanthoulis, Napoleon
1 
Negotiating the EU Data Protection Reform: 
Reflections on the Household Exemption 
Napoleon E. Xanthoulis

Attorney at Law 
LLB (Honours) UCL; BA, MSc Panteion University 
24-16 Larnakos av., Apart. 502, 1035 Pallouriotissa, Nicosia, Cyprus 
napoleon.xanthoulis.09@ucl.ac.uk 
Abstract: The re-drafting of the „household exemption‟ comprises one of the main 
areas of dispute in the course of the ongoing negotiations of the EU data protection 
reform. The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and critically assess the 
wording proposals that have been put forward mainly at EU institutional level and 
identify the particular areas which cause tension. Second, we concomitantly ask 
which is the most appropriate wording for the exemption in question and in particular, 
whether the household exemption should comprise of a set of decisive criteria or 
whether it should provide a more general framework. We eventually argue for a broad 
wording of the Article 2(2)(d) coupled with the addition of further non-determinative 
criteria at Recital 15, i.e. the non-normative part of the proposed Regulation. 
Keywords: Personal data; Household exemption; EU data protection reform; General 
Data Protection Regulation; Data processing; Data controllers; User-generated content 
1. Introduction
The European Commission („EC‟) Vice President Vivian Reding‟s decision to initiate 
a review of the current EU data protection legal framework, in January 2012, has as 
expected dominated the broader legal debate on privacy and personal data protection 
within the European Union („EU‟) and beyond. The proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation (the „Proposed Regulation‟), which aims to replace the existing EU legal 
framework, has been the subject of extensive negotiations at EU inter-institutional 
level and generated a strong debate between the concerned stakeholders, such as 
Internet Service Providers („ISPs‟) and online users representatives. 
In this regard, a major area of dispute comprises a particular issue related to the 
limitation of the scope of the proposed Regulation, namely the so-called „household 
exemption‟. The said exemption has received a surprisingly lack of scholarly 
attention, despite its significance, namely that it practically draws the border lines of 
the application of the proposed Regulation by defining the type of activities which 
may fall under its provisions, contrary to ones that are considered part of a person‟s 
private life.  

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In the past, the definition and application of the household exemption might have 
seemed an easy task; in the WEB 2.0 era it constitutes a complicated and fragile 
puzzle. Wong and Savirimuthu (2008) argue that today individuals have a range of 
new technologies for accessing media and sharing information, while at the same time 
increased connectivity has maximised individuals‟ exposure and immersion to 
information. Apparently, as individuals spend more time in the social spaces, we can 
detect a shift in cultural attitudes towards space, information, identity and privacy. To 
put it simply, determining when a person acts in his personal or household capacity 
instead being active in the public sphere is much harder to define.  
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to ask what is the current stage of negotiations 
at EU level with regard to reforming the household exemption. In particular, we focus 
on presenting and critically assessing the wording proposals made in the course of the 
negotiation process and identify the particular areas of tension. Second, to  ask what is 
the most appropriate wording for the exemption in question. To achieve this, we 
analyse the most prevailing proposals and we categorise them into two general 
schools of thought. We then re-formulate our question: What are the benefits and 
disadvantages of selecting a wording that comprises a set of decisive criteria on the 
one hand, or provides for a more general framework, leaving more space for 
flexibility, on the other. Finally, we present our own view which contains, inter alia, 
elements from both of the abovementioned perspectives. 
We structure the paper as follows: First, we present an overview of the current stage 
of negotiations on the data protection reform at EU level. Second, we critically 
discuss the current application of the household exemption, with reference to the 
wording of Directive 95/46/EC and the relevant Court of Justice of the European 
Union („CJEU‟) jurisprudence. In this context, we identify the main points of 
criticism which raised the need to re-draft the household exemption provision. Third, 
we place the problematique of household exemption in the Web 2.0 context to show 
the interrelation between household exemption and the notion of data controller. We 
focus on how the processing of data within Social Networking Sites („SNS‟) and the 
the use of User-Generated Content („UGC‟) blur the distinction between data subjects 
and data controllers and its implications. Fourth, we discuss, from a critical 
perspective, three suggested criteria in determining the application of the household 
exemption, in the context of the proposed Regulation and identify each one‟s defects. 
Finally, we argue for an alternative option, namely, to provide a general application 
framework within the normative part of the proposed Regulation and include several 
non-determinative criteria at the respective Recital.  
In our paper, we conduct a legal analysis in the course of which we undertake a 
review of primary sources, such as the proposed legislation, internal EU institutional 
documents and EU organ‟s recommendations and reports as well as secondary 
sources, including the relevant academic literature and proposals published by 
concerned private third parties and national competent authorities. We hope that our 
analysis will contribute to the EU data protection reform literature and assist in 
explaining why the debate on the household exemption constitution has raised further 
concerns on the proposed Regulation in terms of controversial wording, potential 
ineffectiveness, and for providing an imbalance of the affected rights and interests. 
3 
2. Negotiating the Reform: Where do we stand?
The reform package comprises two legislative proposals based on Article 16 TFEU, 
the new legal basis for data protection measures introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The 
first proposal constitutes a General Data Protection Regulation which aims to replace 
the existing Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (Lostarakou, 2013). The second is a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on data protection in the field 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which intends to replace the 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. This paper only discusses the application of the 
proposed Regulation. 
The Draft Regulation is currently debated under the ordinary legislative process, 
which gives equal weight to both the European Parliament („EP‟) and the Council of 
the European Union (the „Council‟) by requiring a broad consensus in order to 
become law. Since January 2012, when the EC first published its proposed 
Regulation, it has been the subject of intense negotiations, re-drafts and controversial 
criticism. A striking example of the atmosphere that characterises the on-going debate 
within the EP is that over 3,000 amendments have been put forth by the members of 
the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee („LIBE‟), the latter are 
currently preparing a compromising text for an EP plenary session vote. As a next 
step, once their respective internal positions are prepared, the EP and the Council will 
have to engage into inter-institutional negotiations on the finalized text (Hunton & 
Williams, 2013). 
As far as the Council is concerned, at the end of May 2013, the Presidency published 
a compromised text of the EC‟s original proposal. It also pointed out that several 
member states, still had reservations on the choice of legal form of the proposed 
instrument and would perhaps prefer to agree for a Directive. Whilst at the same time 
acknowledging that substantial progress has been achieved during the negotiations of 
the Proposed Regulation, it considered necessary to note that the approach of the 
member states is a: “conditional one in the sense that no part of the draft Regulation 
can at this stage be finally agreed until the whole text of the Regulation is agreed” 
(Council, 10227/13). Overall, the Council is still to reach a final agreement on several 
issues including, inter alia, the legal form of the reform, the notion of consent, the 
risk-based approach, the extension of the scope to cover EU institutions, agencies and 
bodies and the EC‟s potential power to legislate further, in the form of delegated and 
implemented acts. 
The legislative process is planned to be concluded by mid-2014 and the Regulation 
would be expected to come into force after two years, although significant delays 
raise doubts on the compliance with such an optimistic schedule. If both the EP and 
the Council agree to their respective internal positions by the end of 2013, this would 
give approximately three months for inter-institutional negotiations. Assuming the 
latter are completed on time, the EP‟s would then have chance to vote on the 
negotiated position before the last plenary session in April 2004, i.e. before the next 
EP elections (IAB, 2013). If all goes well, the proposed Regulation is expected, 
according to the optimistic scenario, to come into force sometime in 2016. 
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3. The Household Exemption: Current Legal Framework
(a) Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC
The Directive 95/46/EC (the „Directive‟), currently in force, contains a number of 
exceptions and exemptions, some of them being of general application and others 
limited to specific parts. The so called “household exemption”, under Article 3(2) of 
the Directive, to which this paper focuses, comprises an exemption of general 
application, (Hunton & Williams, 2012) providing that the Directive shall not apply to 
the processing of personal data: “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal 
or household activity”. In other words, where the exemption applies, the provisions of 
the Regulation have no effect. 
The underlying justification for introducing the household exemption can be 
approached both from constitutional, or human rights protection, and regulatory 
perspectives. As Wong and Savirimuthu (2008) suggest, on the one hand, “any 
encroachment in to the private social spaces would be seen as unjustified and contrary 
to the prevailing social norms and values” (in other words, as a violation of the right 
to privacy), while on the other hand, “at a regulatory level, it is not feasible for the 
State or its enforcement authorities to secure compliance with the obligations”. 
The Directive‟s current wording arguably raises more questions rather than providing 
clear answers. How shall the personal and household activities be defined? Is there an 
essential conceptual difference between personal and household types of activities? 
How do we differentiate a purely personal act from a mere personal one? In sum, 
what criteria shall we apply in deciding whether certain activities of data processing 
fall under the abovementioned exemption and how are these criteria defined? 
Despite its importance and the fact that the said provision, as well as the remaining 
essential principles of the Directive, have been implemented in most of the national 
laws of the EU member states, (Mitrou, 2010b) with minor unimportant variations, 
(EC, 2010:8) the application of the household exemption had apparently attracted 
little or no attention, at least until recently. 
In fact, these questions became essential as the unlimited access to internet and the 
more functional and sophisticated information and communication technologies (ICT) 
opened the way for a range of personal processing activities that the current Directive 
could not have been expected to anticipate (Art. 29WP, 2013:2). Individuals today run 
their own websites and blogs, use social networks, sell items on e-commerce 
websites, take part in online petition campaigns and share geo-location data with 
others. As a result, both adults and minors are now able to make personal data about 
themselves or others available worldwide, to anyone, instantly (Art. 29WP, 2013:2-3). 
Defining in binary terms, what is personal from what is not, or in essence, what 
belongs to someone‟s private life from what extends to the public sphere often seems 
an impossible task. However, “[t]he amount of everyday activity that until recently 
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took place away from the computer but is now transferred online, legitimizes the need 
for the law to reflect the variety of online behaviors” (Warso, 2013:492). 
(b) The Linqvist Decision
The CJEU has tried to provide some guidance in this regard, in an effort to limit the 
acknowledged vagueness of Article 3(2) of the Directive and answer the questions 
surrounding the application of the household exemption. 
The leading authority in this respect is the CJEU‟s decision in the Linqvist case. Mrs 
Linqvist, a Swedish national, was prosecuted for failing to comply with the data 
protection laws, following the posting of information relating, inter alia, to her work 
colleagues on her webpage, without prior obtaining their consent. The national court 
referred six questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, one of them being 
whether the act of loading information of this type onto a private home page, which is 
nonetheless , accessible to anyone who knows its address, could be regarded as falling 
outside the scope of the Data Protection Directive on the ground that it is covered by 
one of the exemptions in Article 3(2). The CJEU held inter alia, the following: “[The] 
exception must therefore be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried 
out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case 
with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that 
those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people”(paragraph 47). 
Furthermore, the CJEU in Linqvist was of the opinion that the balancing of the 
concerned interests was a task for the national court. Here, Mrs Lindqvist‟s freedom 
of expression had to be “weighted against the protection of the private life of the 
individuals about whom Mrs Linqvist has placed data on her Internet site”(paragraph 
86). 
In this regard, the CJEU seems to be suggesting that, where certain data can be 
subject to unlimited access, this would result in the act being regarded as falling 
within the scope of the Directive, thus outside the personal/household sphere. In other 
words, unlimited access can constitute a (determinative?) criterion towards deciding 
that the household exemption shall not apply. At the same time, it is noted that the 
CJEU left open the question how cases, where access is granted to anything close to 
but less than “access to an indefinite number of people”, should be treated. 
The Linqvist decision can be perceived as an attempt of the CJEU to essentially define 
what is private in the internet world. However, as it has been argued, this has the 
undesirable effect of creating a public/private partition, without however indicating 
where one may draw the line between private and public purposes (Wong and 
Savirimuthu, 2008). In addition, it seems to be placing an onus on the individuals to 
limit access on their webpages if they wanted to be exempted. In other words 
individuals have to show that the webpage was intended to be used for private 
purposes; a requirement which is a harder threshold to prove. 
Arguably, the decision takes a narrow approach to the scope of the exemption by 
providing that that it will not apply when the processed information is accessible to 
everyone. On the one hand, it implies that the exemption would perhaps only cover 
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situations where information is accessible only to one's family and friends. On the 
other, “mere acquaintances or like minded contacts (such as within a group that shares 
recreational or social concerns) would seem to fall within a grey area, not to mention 
'friends' on social networking sites who may not, in fact, be 'real' friends or even 
acquaintances”(Roth, 2010). 
The rule applied in Linqvist was further affirmed by the CJEU in Satamedia, a case 
where it also held that the activity fell under the scope of the Directive, given than the 
purpose of the activities of Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, “was to make the data 
collected accessible to an unrestricted number of people” (paragraph 44). 
Despite the CJEU‟s genuine efforts to provide clarity to the application of the 
household exemption, the provision in question was still considered as sufficiently 
vague and ambiguous and attracted reasonable criticism. First, due to its vagueness, it 
could not provide any assistance in determining whether an act shall fall under the 
scope of the exemption. Second, it was argued to be too broad, because it could 
exempt, in practice, activities that should essentially fall in a person‟s private sphere, 
such as the ones related to the processing of personal data online and mainly, but not 
exclusively, within online networks (EP, 2012:32; Art. 29WP (2009:78). 
4. Contextualising the Problematique
(a) Household Exemption and Data Controllers in Web 2.0: Two Sides of the Same
Coin?
One way to illustrate the puzzle is to take a closer look on the application of 
household exemption in the online world and particularly to activities undertaken 
within Web 2.0 technologies. Web 2.0 allows users to create and distribute their own 
UGC, which promotes inter alia sharing through mass social networking channels and 
facilitates users to eventually construct their public profile. Social networking 
providers („SNP‟) serve as a tool enabling users to create and exchange content and 
communication (Giannakaki, 2011). This trend has strong foundations as the use of 
SNS sustains the misleading impression of the existence of a web “community” 
Wong, 2008b:11) or in other words, of a false “intimacy on the web” (International 
Working Group, 2008:2), within which information could be kept private. It is this 
impression that encourages individuals to increasingly share more information with 
others. 
Therefore the question becomes to what extent we are ready to accept the Directive‟s 
application to social networking environments and the use of UGC in online 
platforms? (Garrie, Wong, 2010:168) To answer this question, it is important to 
illustrate the direct link between the Directive‟s applicability (the household 
exemption‟s applicability) and the notion of “data controller”. This is due the fact that 
if an individual falls under the definition of data controller, then it simultaneously 
escapes the application of the household exemption and becomes subject to the 
provisions of the Directive.  
Article 2(d) of the Directive provides a broad definition of data controller: “the 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or 
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jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or 
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his 
nomination may be designated by national or Community law”. Put it more simply, 
the controller becomes primarily responsible for the compliance with data protection 
obligations and will also be held liable in case of a breach (Giannakaki, 2011). The 
EC‟s proposed Regulation endorsed essentially the same definition (see Article 4(5)), 
although, the Council‟s compromise text, at the time of writing, omitted the reference 
to “means” in relation to the processing of data, leaving only the “purpose of 
processing” as determinative factor. 
Arguably, if the definition of Article 2(d) is applied literally, then its scope would not 
only cover the SNS but the respective users as well, i.e. individuals who post online 
information taken by the profiles of other users (Wong, 2008b:1). Being qualified as 
data controllers, individual users would be subject to several obligations imposed by 
the Directive, including inter alia ensuring that the processing of the information is 
done in a fair and lawful manner (Article 6(1)(a) and not be excessive (Article 
6(1)(c)) as well as safeguarding specific rights of data subjects under the Directive 
(see Articles 7, 8 and 10). 
In such circumstance, the gateway for escaping the scope of the Directive would be to 
fall under the scope of other exemptions, such as when the processing is made for 
journalistic, artistic and literary purposes (Article 9 of the Directive), or for 
safeguarding public interest values including but not limited to national security, 
defence and public security, or even the when the processing must be considered 
lawful as being part of a person‟s right to freedom of expression (see Article 13(1)). 
In this respect, it would indeed be quite useful to clarify the scope of these exemptions 
(Wong 2009:147), as this exercise would assist in drawing the definitional borders of 
data controllers and therefore of the household exemption as well. Alternatively, in 
the event that none of the abovementioned exemptions apply, the only defense 
available for a user who has undertaken the role of data controller would be to show 
that the individual to whom the personal data in question relate has provided his 
consent for their processing (e.g. Articles 7(a) and 8(2)(a) of the Directive). However, 
showing that such consent has been obtained is not without difficulties (Wong, 
2009:144). To sum up, even if the household exemption cannot apply in a particular 
circumstance, users can still rely on the abovementioned exemptions to prevent the 
application of the Directive‟s provisions. 
The analysis shows that it is becoming increasingly easier for individuals (and not 
merely organizations) to be brought within the scope of the Directive when  within 
SNS context (Wong, 2008b:2). Put it differently, in many cases the processing of 
personal data of other users within SNS (i.e. the posting on information about others 
on facebook) leads individual users to assume the parallel roles of data subject and 
data controller.  
Limiting the scope of the Directive in social networks environment seems to be a far 
from an easy task. On the one hand, the granting of a full exemption from data 
protection requirements to any user who uploads materials to the internet as a private 
individual would lead to easy circumvention of the rules and, in an age of UGC, 
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would fundamentally undermine data protection and privacy itself. Taking the 
opposite view, the full imposition of the law to all such individuals would seem 
excessive and, because of the sheer numbers, would be largely unenforceable (EC, 
2010:8). It may also lead to a flood of court actions on behalf of individuals claiming 
misuse of their private information by other users on SNS (Wong, 2008b:13). 
Therefore, where should the line be drawn?  
The legislators of the Directive had not anticipated the emerging challenges of Web 
2.0 ICT (International Working Group, 2008:2). The new reform builds on the already 
existing concepts, therefore new conceptualization of old concepts becomes 
imperative. Not long ago, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Part („Art. 29WP‟) 
suggested the use of certain factors in deciding whether a SNS user does not act in a 
private context. One of those circumstances would be when the processing 
information is available to a high number of third party contacts, some of whom the 
user may not actually know. In other words, if a user takes an informed decision to 
extend access beyond self-selected „friends‟, this would be an indication that the 
household exception does not apply and thus data controller responsibilities would 
come into force (Art. 29WP, 2009:6). Second, Art. 29WP suggests that if an SNS user 
(or an individual acting on a different platform using UGC) acts on behalf of a 
company or association, or uses the web 2.0 technology mainly as a platform to 
advance commercial, political or charitable goals, then such activity may extend 
beyond a purely personal or household activity and thus the household exemption 
shall not apply. Here, the user appears to assume the full responsibilities of a data 
controller who is disclosing personal data to another data controller (SNS) and to 
other third parties (other SNS users or potentially even other data controllers with 
access to the data) (Art. 29WP, 2009:6). In other words, defining data controllers and 
the scope of household exemption is likely to be a question of fact (Art. 29WP, 
2010:8). The above-mentioned recommendations are being discussed in more detail 
below in the context of the household exemption‟s reform.  
(b) Identifying Tensions in a Drafting Exercise
We have shown that in a world where access to Web 2.0 technologies that enable 
massive data processing is so common, it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
determine whether processing falls under the said exemption or not, (Mitrou, 2012; 
Panagopoulou Koutnatzi, 2012; Piskopani, 2009). In this light, it is imperative that the 
law should provide better criteria for deciding whether or not processing is being done 
for personal or household purposes. Thus, the following questions emerge: (a) which 
criteria shall we apply in making this decision and (b) how should we incorporate 
them into a legal text? As it will be suggested below, the answers to both of these 
questions are equally important and interrelated. 
On the one hand, it is argued that maintaining an equally broad exception for personal 
or household activity (as is currently provided in the Directive) in the proposed 
Regulation will pose an increasing risk for data protection (EDRi, 2013:6) as there 
will be no detailed legal instrument to guarantee the private activity of users in the 
online world. In other words, we need, according to this view, to determine in an 
explicit manner specific criteria that would provide a more solid veil of protection to 
individuals that, despite being active in the virtual world, should still preserve a 
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limited privacy sphere. In the opposite view, composing, from the outset, a list of set 
and potentially decisive criteria might result in providing a too narrow or too broad 
exemption. Such option is criticized for causing the inclusion of more circumstances 
than actually intended within the household exemption‟s scope, while also potentially 
excluding others that should be eligible to trigger the application of the exemption. 
Arguably, the level of prescriptiveness should perhaps be higher in a Regulation than 
a Directive, as the former is directly applicable and needs no further transposition into 
member states laws (Council 16525/1/12:6). Although, in principle this is indeed the 
case, it is, in our view precisely the element of direct applicability which makes the 
selection of wording more challenging. When a rule comes into force in the form of a 
Regulation, once it is enacted, there will be limited space for maneuver beyond the 
literal interpretation.  
5. Reforming the Household Exemption
Several wording suggestions focus on limiting the scope of the household exemption 
by providing one or more determinative criteria in deciding whether it shall apply or 
not, the main ones being the following: (a) gainful interest, (b) 
commercial/professional purpose and (c) data accessible to an indefinite number of 
people. We shall discuss each one in turn. 
(a) The “Gainful Interest” Criterion
The original text of the EC‟s proposed Regulation (2012) provided for a household 
exemption along the lines of the existing Directive, with significant, however, 
differences. In particular, Article 2(2)(d) of the original text provided that the 
Regulation shall not apply to the processing of personal data “by a natural person 
without any gainful interest in the course of its own exclusively personal or household 
activity”. 
Two main points should be made here: First, the new wording introduces the concept 
of “gainful interest”. Second, the EC considered that the previous term “purely” 
should be replaced with the word “exclusively” to provide more clarity in this regard. 
By introducing the criterion of gainful interest, the EC seeks to draw a line between 
those processing activities which are personal and those which are commercial in 
nature, in line with the Australian and Canadian data protection tradition (Roth, 
2010:537-538). 
Since a definition of gainful interest is not provided we seek some guidance from 
Recital 15 which accompanies Article 2(2)(d), where it is mentioned that: “This 
Regulation should not apply to processing of personal data by a natural person, which 
are exclusively personal or domestic […] and without any gainful interest and thus 
without any connection with a professional or commercial activity.” In this regard, EC 
seems to treat the notions of “gainful interest” and “professional or commercial 
activity” as synonymous (BEUC, 2012:10).  
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The limitation of the household exemption‟s scope through the introduction of the 
gainful interest criterion raises certain concerns. First, the reference to gainful interest 
might give the wrong in our view) impression that only non-commercial activity can 
benefit from the exemption (ICO, 2012:4). This becomes more obvious in 
circumstances where, although the processing of personal data is done for gainful 
interest, the activity itself can still regarded as private, for instance, the setting up of a 
website to sell unwanted birthday presents (ICO, 2013:3-4). In this light, the inclusion 
of gainful interest seems to cover unwanted circumstances of data processing which, 
in our view, should fall within the scope of the household exemption, thus escaping 
data controllers‟ obligations. 
(b) The “commercial / professional objective” Criterion
Notwithstanding, EC‟s prima facie treatment of “gainful interest” and professional 
/commercial” objective, as interrelated concepts, it has been argued that the latter 
serves better as a sole criterion in this respect. (ICO, 2013:3-4). When considering the 
application of this criterion, we note, first, that some non-gainful activity – such as 
running an online political campaign – would in this case be regarded as non-
personal, thus falling under the scope of the Regulation. The paradox is quite obvious 
as it would be difficult to argue that a political campaign constitutes part of someone‟s 
private life. In parallel, we also come across certain cases where although the 
processing of personal data on behalf of an individual is done in connection to his or 
her professional activity, such activity should still be benefited from the exemption. 
Such is the case of a worker who posts to his blog details of his or her day-to-day 
work life experiences (ICO, 2012:4). In this view, unless the proposed terms are 
further specified, there is a real risk (similar but broader to the one identified above 
with regard to “gainful interest”) of narrowing or broadening the household 
exemption unduly, thus resulting, in certain cases, to unfair treatment and violation of 
someone‟s right to freedom of expression respectively.  
(c) The “access by an indefinite number of people” Criterion
As mentioned above at paragraph 3(b), the CJEU decided in Linqvist to use the 
criterion of “unlimited access” in determining the application of the household 
exemption. Unsurprisingly, the same criterion has also been suggested to be 
incorporated into the wording of Article 2(2)(d) of the proposed Regulation.   
The main rational in this respect is that the Regulation‟s wording should reflect and be 
in line with the CJEU‟s jurisprudence (EDPS, 2012). In deciding whether an activity 
falls under the public or domestic sector, we should ask whether the information in 
question can be accessed by an indefinite number of individuals or not. The ultimate 
aim seems is simply to prevent individuals making data available to several hundreds 
or even thousands of individuals from automatically falling under the exemption. If 
no limitation is introduced, then almost all SNS users would fall under the definition 
of data controller. In the EDPS‟s own words: “this criterion should be understood as 
an indication that an indefinite number of contacts shall in principle mean that the 
household exception does no longer apply” (2012:15). We note, here, (although it 
shall be discussed in more detail below) that the said criterion, at least as contained in 
the EDPS‟s recommendation, is presented as indicative, rather than a determinative. 
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This view found subsequent support in the Opinions of the EP‟s Committee on Legal 
Affairs and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, which 
voiced for the inclusion in Article 2(2)(d) of both the criteria of gainful interest 
(mentioned above) and access of data to an indefinite number of people. 
Although it indeed seems reasonable and common practice, both from a normative 
and practical perspective, to incorporate the CJEU‟s ratio decidendi in the 
Regulation‟s wording, it has been suggested that the incorporation of the 
abovementioned sole restriction in the normative part of the law would not assist 
much in this respect. As it has been characteristically stated: “References to data 
“made accessible to an indefinite number of individuals” gives rise to questions such 
as: what circumstances should determine whether the circle of potential recipients of 
such data is “definite” or “indefinite”, in particular whether any significance should 
be given to the nature of profiles on social networks (“private” or “public” profiles”) 
or to some other circumstances?” (EP, 2012:33). 
The abovementioned concerns were recently debated extensively within the EP‟s 
LIBE Committee, where its members have so far managed to agree on the following 
worth mentioning wording for the household exemption: “by a natural person (…) in 
the course of (…) exclusively personal or household activity. This exemption also 
shall apply to a publication of personal data where it can be reasonably expected that 
it will be only be accessed by a limited number of persons” (2013:11, 61; 2013b:4). 
The rational for LIBE‟s suggested wording is that the proposed Regulation “should 
not apply to processing of personal data by a natural person, which are exclusively 
personal, family-related, or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of 
addresses or a private sale and without any connection with a professional or 
commercial activity.” Apparently, although LIBE omits from Article 2(2)(d) any 
specific reference to “gainful interest”, it acknowledges that excluding from its scope 
activities with “professional / commercial” purpose is in fact the underlying rationale. 
In addition, it essentially agrees with idea of incorporating the CJEU‟s ratio, however, 
it suggests an alternative wording to the ones presented above, the latter focusing on 
the circumstances where the household exemption would apply, by making reference 
to access “by a limited number of persons”, contrary to the circumstances where it 
shall not, i.e. when the data is accessible by an indefinite number of people (as inter 
alia EDPS proposed). 
Given that LIBE‟s suggestion is at the time of writing the one to be brought before the 
EP‟s plenary session for a final vote, before the inter-institutional negotiations with 
the Council commence, it worth to pay a closer look. By conducting a literal 
interpretation of the suggested wording we conclude that it prima facie comprises two 
situations when the household exemption shall apply: The first one refers to the case 
where a natural person‟s act is conducted in the course of exclusively personal or 
household activity. The “second”, appears to be an additional and independent case, 
in view of the wording “also shall apply”; although, the author‟s intention could have 
merely been to explain and analyze the scope of the previous sentence. In any 
circumstance, what appears to be a “second” case provides for three requirements that 
must be met in order for it to apply: (a) the personal data must be published, (b) there 
must be an expectation that there will be limited access to the said personal data 
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(“access by a limited number of persons”) and (c) the expectation in question must be 
reasonable. Here, LIBE introduces an objective reasonableness test by which a court 
would have to assess the nature and the particular circumstances surrounding the 
publication of the personal data to conclude whether it provides limited access to third 
parties. In this regard, to exclude the application of the exemption, there would be no 
need to provide additional evidence that the said personal data has indeed been 
accessed by an indefinite number of people. The only thing required to show in this 
case is that a reasonable person would expect that under those circumstances this 
would indeed be the case. 
 
In our view, LIBE‟s wording, although provides some guidance on how the criterion 
of “unlimited access” shall be applied, it does not resolve the practical difficulties 
mentioned above at paragraph 3(b) in relation to the Linqvist decision. In fact, it is the 
inability of such sole criterion to cover all possible situations that has allowed 
alternative wording options to emerge.  
 
The main alternative view argues for the non-decisiveness of the unlimited access 
criterion, i.e. that it should not determine per se whether the exemption shall apply or 
not. Instead, such criterion should be treated only as one of the several factors to be 
considered in assessing a given case, by taking into account the related rights of the 
concerned parties, in particular the freedom of expression (EP, 2012:33). The 
following argument made by the Art. 29 WP is in our opinion reflecting the gravity of 
this view: “making information available to the world at large should be an important 
consideration when assessing whether or not processing is being done of personal 
purposes. However, this should not in itself be considered determinative. […We] need 
to think though the many consequences – in terms of competing rights as well as 
logictics – of the possibility of bringing hundreds of millions of social network users – 
many of whom will have part of their profile open to anyone – and bloggers for 
example – within the scope of data protection law”(2013:9). In this light, it is 
submitted that this criterion should only comprise part of the Regulation‟s Recital 15 
and not be included in the strict wording of Article 2(2)(d), as we will discuss below. 
 
(d) Beyond Normativity: Conciseness and Guidance 
 
The critical presentation of the abovementioned three suggested criteria (otherwise 
limitations) to the household exemption has shown that each of them suffers alone 
from specific defects. For each of the proposed wordings, we have been able to: (a) 
identify situations where a natural person would be treated unfairly either because the 
criterion applied is deemed to result in too broad or too narrow application of the 
exemption and/or (b) identify significant ambiguity in the wording, which results in 
failing to effectively succeed its purpose, if not creating further complications.  
 
These concerns have led us to consider whether the option of maintaining a rather 
flexible and broad wording in the normative part of the Regulation, that would capture 
all instances, without, at the same time, excluding or including more than the ones 
actually intended, might be of assistance in this respect. We acknowledge that such 
proposal appears prima facie to bring us backwards to the Directive‟s current 
wording, which seemingly we have been trying to reform throughout this paper. 
Indeed, this apparent impression is partly true. However, as it will be shown, any 
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potential deficiency or vagueness caused by the generality of Article 2(2)(d) would be 
outweighed, in this respect, by the addition of several criteria in the non-normative 
part, in the form of non-decisive factors that would be taken into account in 
determining the application of the household exemption in each case.  
 
This approach has so far found strong support in the Art. 29WP‟s recent opinion 
earlier this year, where it argued for the preservation of the current wording of Article 
3(2) of the Directive (with a minor replacement of the phrase “of a purely” with the 
equivalent “of its own exclusively”) (2013:10). Approaching it from another 
perspective, the Working Party opinioned for omitting the EC‟s proposed “gainful 
interest” criterion and maintaining a flexible but admittedly vague wording as 
explained above. But that‟s not all. What could arguably be missing from Article 
2(2)(d),  the Working Party believes it should be incorporated exclusively in Recital 
15 of the proposed Regulation. To put it simply, since it appears that we are unable to 
provide for a sole criterion within Article 2(2)(d) (or even a small list of those) that 
would decisively provide a clear cut solution for each case, without causing unjust 
outcomes, the only realistically practical solution would be to provide a longer list of 
criteria that would function more as guides rather than switches. Such guides would 
be considered by a court or national competent authority in a collective manner and 
not individually, by taking into consideration the particular facts of each case and the 
potential conflicting rights of the concerned parties. 
 
How such perspective can be applied in practice is illustrated in the Working Party‟s 
opinion, which we shall now turn to consider in more detail. First, the Working Party 
provides in its suggested Recital 15 the general foundation upon which the household 
exemption shall apply, i.e. “to processing of personal data by a natural person, which 
is exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence, the holding of addresses 
of personal contacts or the use of social network sites that is outside the pursuit of a 
commercial or professional objective”. Then, having marked the general context, it 
further proceeds to define four criteria to be used in determining whether a processing 
falls within the personal/household exemption, namely: (a) potential dissemination of 
personal data to an indefinite number of persons rather than to a limited community of 
friends or family members; (b) the nature of the relationship between the person 
posting certain data and the person to which the posted information refers to; 
i.e.whether the personal  data is about individuals who have no personal or household 
relationship with the person posting; (c) whether the scale and frequency of the 
processing of personal data suggests professional or full-time activity and (d) whether 
there is evidence of a number of individuals acting together in a collective and 
organised manner. 
 
Remarkably, the negotiations within the Council, at the time of writing, seem to be in 
favor of partially adopting the above mentioned perspective. Although we are not in a 
position to conclude whether this outcome is a result of conscious choice or due to the 
member states‟ inability to reach a consensus with regard to including a sole or more 
criteria in the normative part, we note the Presidency‟s remarks that Article 2(2)(d) 
was re-drafted “with a view to reaching a broadly acceptable solution”(Council: 
10227/13:4). 
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More specifically, the latest compromise text published by the Irish Presidency on the 
EC‟s original proposal (Council: 10227/13:8,37) suggests the following wording for 
Article 2(2)(d): “by a natural person in the course of a personal or household 
activity;” We note that the criterion of gainful interest and the reference to 
“exclusivity” contained in the original EC‟s proposal was omitted, which according to 
the Presidency‟s own words “gave rise to interpretation difficulties and controversy”. 
Unfortunately, the Council‟s proposal for the respective Recital 15 is not as rich as the 
one analysed above by the Art. 29WP, given that it remains to a great extent, along 
the lines of the EC‟s proposal with an addition worth noting, namely a general 
reference to “social networking and on-line activities”. 
Inevitably, a number of questions still remain unanswered, illustrating the challenges 
of endorsing such approach: When is person considered to use SNS as a platform to 
advance commercial, political or charitable goals? Concomitantly, when a large 
number of contacts become too high to be acceptable to the regulator? What does 
knowing or being in a relationship with someone in the virtual world mean? (EC, 
2010:7) A preliminary answer to these questions could be that: (a) it might not be 
useful to provide a theoretical and abstract response which, although it could prima 
facie be easily applied uniformly, however, it would remain unrelated to the specific 
facts of each case, thus potentially leading to unfair judicial decisions and (b) all the 
above mentioned criteria should be given collectively proportionate weight in 
balancing the rights of the concerned parties. 
Assuming such perspective comes into force, it would be the initial role of the 
national courts and competent authorities to conduct the respective assessment, based 
on the facts brought before them. Admittedly, the data protection reform in question 
aims inter alia to integrate the differentiated data protection laws currently applied 
within the EU member states; however, considering the various data protection and 
privacy traditions among Europe, it not unlikely that this might be a long process. In 
the event that such proposal becomes law, we would expect, at the early stage that 
national authorities will give different weight to the provided criteria, which would 
then perhaps result in a less uniform application of the household exemption between 
member states. Such controversies caused by the domestic differentiated approaches 
would, however, be finally solved by the CJEU in the form of preliminary rulings 
following references from national courts. Eventually, a set of CJEU pilot decisions 
would provide the appropriate guidance on the interpretation and application of 
Article 2(2)(d) to which all national court and authorities would have to comply. The 
potential option of having the EC or other specialized bodies such as EDPS and Art. 
29WP occasionally, issuing guidelines, recommendations and best practices to ensure 
consistent application of the Regulation by the national Data Protection authorities 
would certainly limit any differentiated application of the said provisions among 
member states (Council 16525/1/12:6). In our view, this admittedly long term but well 
tested cooperation between the CJEU, EC and national courts and authorities would 
provide for an effective application of Article 2(2)(d).   
5. Conclusion
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The household exemption, as is currently provided in the Directive 95/46/EC, lacks 
the desired and necessary clarity in determining when and how the processing of 
certain data on behalf of a person shall fall under its scope, particularly when the 
processing act takes place in Web 2.0 environment. The CJEU‟s guidance in this 
respect, and in particular the Linqvist decision, does not solve the fundamental defects 
of Article 3(2) of the Directive and at the same time leaves a number of questions 
unanswered. 
The processing of personal data within Web 2.0 technologies illustrates the 
interrelation between the applicability of household exemption and the definition of 
data controller. The users‟ increasing processing of personal data within SNS and the 
wide use of UGC results in individuals assuming the parallel roles of data controller 
and data subject, thus blurring the tension between the two concepts.  
Reforming the household exemption proves to be a key area of dispute in the course 
of the ongoing negotiations on the EU data protection reform. The major tension lies 
on the selection of criteria, if any, which would be expressly mentioned in the 
normative part of the proposed Regulation. This is due to the fact that they shall in 
principle determine whether a processing act shall be regarded as belonging to a 
user‟s private life or not. At the present stage, the two institutions, equally involved in 
the legislative process, namely the Council and the EP, have both decided to amend 
the EC‟s original draft, each reaching to different proposals for the wording of what 
would be Article 2(2)(d) of the proposed Regulation. On the one hand, EP‟s LIBE 
committee, seems to be in favor of incorporating the ratio of Linqvist decision, as a 
criterion in applying the household exemption which refers to the situations where the 
processed data can be accessed by an indefinite number of people. The Council, on 
the other, is, so far, in favor of adopting a broad wording, equivalent to the one 
provided by the current Directive, without however containing any further significant 
guidance, which is in our opinion an essential defect. 
Our analysis has shown that the inclusion of one or more determinative criteria in the 
normative part of the Regulation, although would prima facie lead to a more uniform 
application of the exemption, in fact, it is likely that  would eventually cause either 
too broad or too limited application of the exemption, thus resulting to unjust 
outcomes. In this light, we argue that perhaps the most appropriate and practically 
efficient option would be to incorporate a broad wording at the Article 2(2)(d) and 
add further non-determinative criteria at the non-normative part, namely Recital 15 of 
the proposed Regulation. The application of the said criteria should be conducted in a 
collective manner and the balance of the respective interests and rights of the 
concerned parties would be succeeded by taking into consideration the particular facts 
of the case. This solution arms a judge or competent authority with a list of non-
determinative criteria to be used as a toolbox, in assessing whether certain processing 
falls under the scope of the proposed Regulation, rather than forcing an abstract 
ticking-the-box exercise, which would disregard the diversity of cases that can arise in 
the virtual world and in particular in Web 2.0 environment. 
In other words, we argue that the vast variety of users‟ online activities, particularly 
the ones that involve UGC and participation in SNS, prevent the EU legislator from 
sufficiently providing for a clear-cut definition of “private conduct” (as opposed to 
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activity done in public), thus, leading us to conclude that a fair, efficient and practical 
solution would only be achieved if the matter is left to be subsequently determined on 
case by case basis, by national courts and competent authorities and eventually the 
CJEU. Such long process might result to the initial fragmentation of the interpretation 
of proposed Regulation‟s scope, at least in the short term, before a homogenous 
application of the proposed exemption is achieved. 
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